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the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, issued an order affecting
the substantial rights of Defendant/Appellant on May 12, 1987.
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written authorization which shall entitle the owner to
receive the property from the person having custody of it.
When property so obtained is received in evidence, it shall
be retained by the clerk of the court last receiving it or
shall be returned by him to the custody of the peace
officer until all direct appeals and retrials are final, at
which time the property shall be returned in accordance
with this section. In the event that the prosecuting
attorney considers it necessary to retain control over the
evidence, in anticipation of possible collateral attacks
upon the judgment or of use in some potential prosecution,
he may decline to authorize return.
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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
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privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
vii.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

v.

:

THOMAS GENE DAVIS,

:

Case No. 870221-CA

:

Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from an order and judgment against
Thomas Eugene Davis denying Appellant's Motion to Compel the Return
of Property seized from him at the time of his arrest. Charges
against Appellant were dismissed; however, on May 12, 1987, the
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, Third Judicial Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered his order refusing to
require the State to return the property to Mr. Davis.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 30, 1984, at approximately 3:45 p.m., Dave
Bascom, an investigator with the Attorney General's office observed
Gwendolon Hall hand what appeared to be credit cards or similar
documents to Cindy Slagowski.

Mr. Bascom followed Ms. Slagowski as

she drove alone to the First Interstate Bank at 1955 West North
Temple.

It appeared that Ms. Slagowski was followed to the bank by

a car containing Ms. Hall, Thomas Davis, Larry Person and Carl
Barr.

See Addendum A, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

Facts 1 and 2.

Mr. Bascom observed Ms. Slagowski issue a check in the
amount of three hundred ninety six dollars and eighty-six cents
($396.86) on the account of the Shade Shop.

The second vehicle

which Mr. Bascom believed contained the four individuals appeared to
be parked in a position to observe Ms. Slagowski. None of the four
individuals entered the bank.

(See Addendum A, Facts 4 and 5 ) .

The four individuals did not make contact with
Ms. Slagowski; Mr. Bascom watched Ms. Slagowski drive alone out of
the parking lot. The second vehicle appeared to follow Ms.
Slagowski.

(See Addendum A, Facts 4 and 5 ) .
At approximately 4:15 p.m., Ms. Slagowski was arrested at

710 South 200 West, attempting to cash a check.

Davis, Person, Barr

and Carter were arrested a short time later in the second vehicle at
approximately 200 South 400 West. After Ms. Slagowski entered the
first bank, at no time did Mr. Bascom observe contact between Ms.
Slagowski and any occupants of the second vehicle.

In addition,

there were several minutes during which the second vehicle was not
under surveillance.

(See Addendum A, Facts 6 and 7 ) .

Officers searched both vehicles and all five
individuals.

They found no cash in either vehicle, thirty-three

cents ($0.33) in the possession of Barr, three dollars and ninetyseven cents ($3.97) in possession of Slagowski, eleven dollars and
ninety-five cents ($11.95) in possession of Carter, one hundred
fifty one dollars and nine cents ($151.09) in the possession of
Person and two hundred seventy-seven dollars and thirty-eight cents
($277.38) in the possession of Davis.

- 2 -

(See Addendum A, Fact 8 ) .

Ms. Slagowski pleaded guilty and on February 3, 1986.
The State moved to dismiss the case against Mr. Davis and the other
three individuals because "the witnesses who observed criminal
activity are unable to make positive identification of said
defendants, and that the State would not be able to meet its burden
of proof.

. . ." The Court granted the State's motion to dismiss.

(See Addendum A, Fact 9).
immediately after the Court dismissed the case, Mr. Davis
requested the return of his money.

No other person or entity made a

formal claim for the funds. The prosecutor and case detective
determined the money was no longer needed as evidence and notified
Mr. Davis through his attorney the State would return his money upon
"proof of ownership satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney".
Utah Code Ann. §77-24-2 (1953 as amended).

See

(See Addendum A, Fact

10) .
Mr. Davis presented an affidavit to the prosecutor
stating he was the lawful owner of the money on February 10, 1986.
See Addendum A, Exhibit "A" to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

Upon advice of counsel, Mr. Davis initially declined to be

questioned under oath as to the manner in which he had obtained the
money.

The prosecutor refused to return Mr. Davis1 money.

(See

Addendum A, Fact 12).
Mr. Davis, by and through counsel, filed a motion to
compel the return of such property.

After argument and submission

of memoranda, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision on June 16,
1986.

See Addendum A, Fact 13 and Exhibit "B" to Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law.
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On June 19, 1986, Mr. Davis and his counsel again met
with the prosecutor.

Mr. Davis answered questions regarding the

source of his money under oath.

He testified he received most of

the money selling property for Jack Bernel of Peddler's Pawn Shop at
swap meets and he also received some of the money from doing
automobile detail work for Steve Fisher at a Salt Lake automobile
paint shop.

The prosecutor took the position he would refuse to

return the money until a detective verified or refuted Mr. Davis1
testimony.

(See Addendum A ) .
On July 15, 1986f the prosecutor still had not returned

Mr. Davis1 money.

At that time, Mr. Davis filed a Motion for an

evidentiary hearing in order to compel the return of his money.
The hearing on Mr. Davis1 motion was held on August 20,
1986.

At that time, the prosecutor refused to return the money

because:
a) The detective had been unable to contact the persons
Mr. Davis1 named as sources of his funds and therefore
could neither confirm nor refute Mr. Davis1 testimony.
b) The prosecutor believed, based on the facts
surrounding the forgery it was very unlikely the parties
had time to dispose of the money received by Slagowski.
c) The prosecutor had been told by the attorney for
Person that Person and Barr had obtained the forged
checks, recruited Slagowski to cash them and had given
Slagowski half the proceeds. Person and Barr had not
seen what Slagowski had done with her half of the
proceeds.
(See Addendum A, Point 19).
The detective testified at the August 20, 1987 hearing
that his unsuccessful efforts to contact the persons named by Davis
as sources of the funds had only been made a few days before the
August 20, 1987, hearing.

(See Addendum A, Point 20).
- 4 -

In its conclusions, the Court determined that:
1. An ancillary proceeding in a criminal case is the
appropriate forum to determine whether a prosecutor
abused his discretion in refusing to return property to a
criminal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-24-2 (1953 as
amended).
2. The defendant must sustain the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the prosecutor abused
his discretion.
3. That Mr. Davis failed to sustain his burden of proof,
and,
4. Proceedings ancillary to a criminal case to determine
whether a prosecutor abused his discretion in not
returning property of a defendant are not the kind of
proceeding where the state must bear the cost of
preparing a transcript for appeal.
(See Addendum A, Conclusions).
Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law,
the Court entered its order on May 12, 1987, that:
1. Mr. Davis' Motion to Compel the Return of Property be
denied; and,
2. Mr. Davis' Motion to Compel the State to Bear the
Cost of Transcribing the Record be denied.
(See Addendum A, Order)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant argues the trial court erred in upholding the
prosecutor's decision to not return money seized at the time of his
arrest. Appellant believes the trial court had ongoing jurisdiction
to handle the matter because it arises out of a criminal charge.
The prosecutor's decision to keep the money once the underlying
criminal charge was dismissed violated Appellant's due process
rights.

Furthermore, even if Mr. Davis were required to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that his money was not obtained by
illegal means, he sustained that burden.
- 5 -

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT RETAINED ONGOING CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION TO EXAMINE THE ISSUE OF RETURN OF
PROPERTY SEIZED DURING THE ARREST OF MR. DAVIS.
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision determined it
had jurisdiction to review the issue of return of property seized at
the time of Mr. Davis' arrest on criminal charges and noted the
matter was "quasi-criminal" in nature. There is no dispute the
trial court reviewed the matter subsequent to its jurisdiction of
Mr. Davis on a criminal matter.

The trial court reasoned the

statutory provision in question, §77-24-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended) is found in the criminal code.

Its conclusion seemed to be

based on the logic of the legislature's decision to locate the
statute in the Code of Criminal Procedure, thereby conferring
jurisdiction upon the criminal court.
As indicated in the preceding statute, §77-24-1 Utah Code
Ann. (1953 as amended), the statute in question, §77-24-2 pertains
only to property seized in criminal proceedings. The language of
the preceeding section, §77-24-1 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended)
indicates the property must be seized pursuant to a search warrant
or an arrest for any public offense.

Therefore, the subject matter

of the statute must be linked to crime. Additionally, §77-1-2 Utah
Code Ann. (1953 as amended) states, "[t]he procedure in criminal
cases shall be as prescribed in this title, the rules of criminal
procedure.

. . ." Appellant can cite to no statutory provision in

the Code indicating any chapter within Title 77 is anything other
than criminal in nature and relies on the legislature's choice for
- 6 -

placement of the statute in the criminal code to support his
position the matter is criminal.
Courts which have found forfeiture or condemnation
proceedings civil in nature have declared the proceedings were not
punitive but rather were to protect the public from articles which
might be injurious to the public. United States v. Thirty-Eight
Cases, 99 F. Supp. 460 (CD. N.Y. 1951).

The court in that case

noted condemnation of misbranded food was for the "protection of the
public health and to prevent deception of the purchasing public."
Id. at 463.
The principle announced in State v. Certain Intoxicating
Liquors, 53 Utah 171, 177 P. 235 (Utah 1918) lends support to
Appellant's position the proceeding is criminal,

in that case, the

Utah Supreme Court found the acquittal of the defendant in a
municipal court on criminal charges of unlawful possession of
liquors was no bar to a subsequent trial in the district court
regarding forfeiture of the liquor. Although the language of the
Court in Certain Intoxicating Liquors is not entirely clear, the
Court stated, "the trial of this class of cases is to be conducted
as in crminal prosecutions, . . ."

Id. at 236.

It would seem

therefore, that the forfeiture proceeding was criminal in nature.
However, unlike the case at bar, in Certain Intoxicating Liquors,
the Court reasoned acquittal on the underlying criminal charges was
not dispositive in the forfeiture action because the property
involved was inherently illegal in violation of laws prohibiting the
possession of intoxicating liquors. The Court therefore had an
obligation to the public to dispose of the property.
- 7 -

Money, on the

other hand,

cannot be considered inherently illegal. Awaya v.

Hawaii, 705 P.2d 54 at 61 (Hawaii 1985).

Furthermore, the

proceeding in Certain Intoxicating Liquors, unlike the proceeding in
the case at bar, was "directed wholly against the liquors in the
interest of the public, not for the purpose of subjecting the
defendant . . . to any penalties, . . ." 177 P. at 236.

In the

present case, the public does not need to be protected from Mr.
Davis1 possession of money.
Additionally, unlike the situation in Certain
Intoxicating Liquors, in the case at bar, the statute is indeed
punitive in nature.

The statute provides, ff[p]roperty so obtained

which is not needed as evidence shall be returned to the owner if he
may lawfully possess it."

(emphasis added.)

By using the term

"lawfully" the legislature has excluded the return of property which
is inherently illegal. For comparison see §58-37-13 Utah Code Ann.
(1953 as amended) which declares drug paraphernalia inherently
illegal.

Forfeiture of property contemplated by §77-24-2 is

therefore not that which is inherently deleterious, harmful or
illegal.

Any such forfeiture is therefore wholly punitive in nature

because the legislature contemplated only lawful property in the
statute.
Because forfeiture of the property in the case at bar
would be punitive, acquittal on the underlying charge ought to block
any subsequent proceeding.

Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 6

S.Ct. 437, 29 L.Ed. 684 (1886).

In Coffey v. United States, the

Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a civil forfeiture
proceeding should be barred by an acquittal on the underlying
- 8 -

criminal charges. The Court found acquittal of concealing distilled
spirits with the intent to defraud the government of tax revenue
barred forfeiture action on the spirits, in Coffey, -the United
States argued because the burden of proof on the underlying criminal
charges was beyond a reasonable doubt and the burden of proof on the
forfeiture proceeding would have been by only a preponderance of the
evidence, it would have been possible for the United States to lose
on the criminal proceeding and yet win on the civil proceeding.
government argued it should therefore be allowed to proceed.
Court held otherwise.

The

The

The Court reasoned because the parties and

the subject matter were the same in both proceedings and no new
trial of the criminal matter could take place, any subsequent trial
of the civil suit would amount to "substantially the same thing."
Id. at 443.
Although several courts have declined to follow the rule
of Coffey, Coffey has never been overruled.

See United States v.

Thirty-Eight Cases, 99 F. Supp. 460 (D.C. N.Y. 1951) for a
discussion that Coffey still governs the effect of an acquittal in a
criminal proceeding on a subsequent forfeiture proceeding which is
penal in nature.
In the case at bar where the legislature has drafted a
law lacking guidance on the matter, Appellant must additionally be
allowed to rely on the equitable powers inherent in the trial court
to resolve the dispute. Awaya v. Hawaii, 705 P.2d 54 (Hawaii
1985).

In Awaya, the court addressed the issue of return of

property seized once the government no longer needed it for
evidence,

in Awaya, seizure of jewelry was found to be outside the
- 9 -

scope of the search warrant and was therefore suppressed.

During

the government's delay of filing criminal charges, the owner of the
jewels filed a motion for return of the property.

The Court found

the motion could properly be addressed to the equity jurisdiction of
the court.

Id. at 61.
Additionally, if Appellant were forced to proceed in a

civil proceeding, his right to court appointed counsel would not
attach.

As an indigent he would be placed in the unfair position of

being forced to attempt to comply with court processes and
requirements pro se.
Furthermore, viewing the matter from the stand point of
judicial economy, the trial court, having disposed of the underlying
criminal matter and familiarized itself with the case, parties and
subject matter, is in the best position to review the prosecutor's
decision regarding the return of the property.

Finally, the seizure

of the property and ultimate dismissal of the case against Appellant
were both criminal proceedings.

Barring clear evidence property

seized was obtained illegally or is in any way illegal or harmful to
the public, the trial court is in the best position to compel, in a
criminal proceeding, the return of property no longer needed as
evidence.
Because the proceeding was criminal in nature, the trial
court erred in requiring Mr. Davis to prove the source of his funds
and in carrying out the proceeding as set forth infra.
Furthermore, because the matter was criminal in nature,
the trial court erred in failing to order the preparation of a
transcript.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1 (1953 as amended),
- 10 -

an indigent defendant is entitled to "a first appeal of right and
the prosecuting of other remedies before and after conviction,
considered by the defending counsel to be in interest of
justice. . ." . Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-32-5 (1953 as
amended), "the expenses of printing or typewriting briefs on first
appeals of right on behalf of an indigent defendant, as well as
depositions and other transcripts shall be paid by the county."

In

light of the foregoing statutory provisions, should this Court
determine that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth
in Addendum A do not set forth an adequate factual basis from which
to appeal, Mr. Davis respectfully requests that as an alternative
remedy, this Court order the preparation of a transcript at State
expense and afford Mr. Davis a further opportunity to brief this
matter by citing such transcript.
POINT II. THE OPERATION OF §77-24-2 UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED (1953 AS AMENDED) DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF HIS
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
A.

THE STATUTE VIOLATES APPELLANTfS STATE AND UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS.

The statute in question §77-24-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended) vests authority in the prosecuting attorney to allow return
of property seized "upon proof of ownership and of lawfulness of
possession satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney."

The statute

is silent regarding what should be done with the property or who
should review the matter when, as in the case at bar, the
prosecutor's satisfaction has not been met. Likewise the statute
provides no guidance as to what factors the prosecutor must consider
nor what weight any facts presented by the accused must be given.
- 11 -

The statute also fails to require the state to verify or refute the
accused's assertions regarding ownership.

Further, the statute

fails to provide for a hearing on the matter.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, . . ."

Similarly, Article I,

Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides, "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
Article I, §11 of the Utah Constitution provides, "every person, for
an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, . . . "
Our Supreme Court has stated, lf[i Implicit in the due
process clause of our State Constitution is that persons be afforded
a hearing to determine their rights under the law."
Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978).

Gribble v.

The statute in question fails to

provide for such a hearing.
In Hulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Utah 1980) the
Court announced due process safeguards of both the United States and
the Utah Constitutions operate to protect individuals from state
action.

Appellant is such an individual needing protection from

state action.
Although a statute must be construed to avoid
constitutional infirmities if possible,! the statute in question

1

In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah, 1981).
- 12 -

fails to meet constitutional fundamental fairness due process
concerns.
To meet due process safeguards, the statute must first
clearly define the scope of permissible conduct. The Court
considered this issue in In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981).

In

Boyer, the Court reviewed the district court's order appointing a
guardian for a mildly retarded woman.

"When state action impinges

on fundamental rights, due process requires standards which clearly
define the scope of permissible conduct so as to avoid unwarranted
intrusion on those rights."

Id. at 1087-88.

The Court stated sufficient flexibility must be
maintained to insure the purposes of the statute be effectuated, yet
the language must also convey "sufficiently definite" standards.
Id. at 1088. The Court found by applying "specific, objective
standards for determining the ability of one to care for oneself,"
the statute could be narrowly interpreted and thus the Court avoided
finding the statute unconstitutional.

Ij3. at 1089.

Our Supreme Court has also elaborated upon due process
safeguards in Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199
(Utah 1984).

In Wells, the Court carefully examined due process

safeguards as they related to termination of fundamental rights and
in particular, to parental rights. By analogy to other fundamental
rights, the Court found the proponent of legislation "must show (1)
a compelling state interest in the result to be achieved and (2)
that the means adopted are narrowly tailored to achieve the basic
statutory purpose."

Id. at 206 citing In re Boyer, 636 P.2d at 1090.

- 13 -

None of the specific or objective standards exist in the
grant of prosecutorial power present in the statute. Assuming the
return of lawfully possessed property to its rightful owner is a
legitimate state interest, the statute fails to establish narrow
guidelines for the prosecutor to follow.

The requisite specific and

objective standards which the State would have to follow to meet due
process concerns are lacking.

It is this lack of objectivity which

clouded the prosecutor's perception in the case at bar and which
resulted in violation of Mr. Davis' due process rights.

The

statute vests virtually unfettered discretion in the hands of the
prosecutor.
B.

APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS
BECAUSE HE WAS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE
THE MATTER DECIDED BY A NEUTRAL PARTY.

The statute in the case at bar provides for the return of
property no longer needed for evidence if proof of ownership and
lawfulness is met to the satisfaction of the prosecuting attorney.
The statute fails to provide for review of discretion or any hearing
by a neutral and detached magistrate.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct.
2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874, 92 S.Ct.
26, 30 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971), the Court found a warrant issued by the
state attorney general acting as a justice of the peace who had
supervised police activities relating to the crime was invalid
because it was not issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. The
Court found the Fourth Amendment's protection required the action of
a neutral and detached magistrate rather than the action of one
charged with the "enterprise of ferreting out crime."
- 14 -

The Court

continued,

ff

[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the

right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer,
not by a policeman or government enforcement agent,"
11

Id, at 449.

[P]rosecutors and policemen simply cannot be asked to maintain the

requisite neutrality with regard to their own investigations—the
'competitive enterprise' that must rightly engage their
single-minded attention."

Id. at 450.

It is precisely the bias of the prosecutor's adversarial
role which prevented him from adequately protecting Appellant's due
process rights in the case at bar.

The prosecutor in this case is

actively engaged in the competitive enterprise of advocating his
client's (the state) interest with zeal.

Anything less would be a

violation of his ethical responsibilities as a lawyer.

His role as

an advocate in the underlying proceedings prevented him from acting
in the neutral and detached manner required to meet due process
concerns.
POINT III. APPELLANT SUSTAINED HIS BURDEN OF
PROOF AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING HELD ON HIS MOTION
TO COMPEL THE RETURN OF PROPERTY.
On August 20, 1986, Judge Hanson held an evidentiary
hearing for the purposes of determining whether the money found on
Mr. Davis at the time of his arrest should be returned to him.
Prior to the hearing, Mr. Davis had sworn out an affidavit for the
prosecutor declaring he was the owner of the money and entitled its
possession.

(See Addendum A.)

Mr. Davis and his attorney had met

with the prosecutor on June 19, 1986.

Under oath, Mr. Davis

answered questions regarding the sources of the money.

He indicated

he had received some of the money for payment on auto detail work
- 15 -

for Steve Fisher at a Salt Lake automobile paint shop.

He further

testified he earned most of the money through a business arrangement
he had with Mike Garrity.

He and Mr. Garrity had sold property for

Jack Bernel of Peddler's Pawn Shop on Eighth South 200 West at swap
meets and various other places. Mr. Davis did not account for all
of the cash in his possession at the time of the arrest.

(See

Addendum A, Fact 16).
Forgery detective Jerry Campbell was requested by the
prosecutor to either verify or refute Mr. Davis1 assertions.
However at the August 20th hearing, the Detective had neither
verified nor refuted Mr. Davis1 assertions. No person or entity had
placed any claim on the money other than Mr. Davis. Additionally,
the prosecutor had been informed by counsel for Person during plea
negotiations that Person and Barr had recruited Ms. Slagowski to
pass the forged checks. Ms. Slagowski in return had been allowed to
keep half of the proceeds. The check she successfully cashed was in
the amount of $396.86.

(See Addendum A, Fact 17, 19, 20).

According to the Findings drafted by the prosecutor, the
investigator from the Utah Attorney's General's Office initially
observed Ms. Slawgowski in contact with four other individuals,
including Mr. Davis before she passed the check.

Mr. Davis was not

observed to pass anything between himself and Ms. Slagowski, the two
were only observed embracing.

Although the investigator also

observed Ms. Slawgowski leaving the bank after she cashed the check,
and followed her to a second bank where she attempted to pass
another check, he never observed her to have any further contact
with Mr. Davis.
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Section 77-24-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) states,
"[plroperty so obtained which is not needed as evidence shall be
returned to the owner if he may lawfully possess it."
added.)

(emphasis

There is no dispute the money held by the state in the case

at bar is not needed as evidence.

The charge against Mr. Davis was

dismissed upon motion of the State when the State indicated it could
not prosecute Mr. Davis due to insufficient evidence.

Specifically,

the statute only authorizes the prosecutor to decline to authorize
return of the property if the prosecutor anticipates collateral
attacks or potential prosecution.

Presumably the prosecutor in the

case at bar has held the money because his satisfaction as to the
ownership and lawfulness of the money has not been met.
Appellant can cite to no Utah authority directly on point
but relies on the following case by analogy.

In Angelos v. First

Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983), the jury returned
a Special Verdict which found inter alia that the embezzling dental
assistant's husband, Russel, knew of embezzlement by Mccormick and
received embezzled funds for which he failed to give reasonable
consideration; and further, that Russell directed, encouraged or
requested Mccormick to embezzle with the intent to benefit himself
from Mccormick's wrongful conduct.

Id. at 775. The trial court

ruled the Bank had no claim against Russell, and the Bank then
appealed.

The Court found Russell was not a bona fide purchaser

without notice and was therefore liable to the Bank for the amount
of converted funds, in reaching its decision, the court relied upon
the Special Verdict findings.

It was clear the disputed money was

not lawfully held by Russell. No such similar findings existed in
- 17 -

the case at bar.

The money found on Mr. Davis could not be traced

to the money Ms. Slagowski received by uttering forged checks. The
State had no evidence the money was not obtained through lawful
means and money is not inherently illegal. Awaya v. Hawaii.
Additionally the State could not refute Mr. Davis1 assertions the
money was obtained through lawful means.
Campbell v. Cochran, 416 A.2d 211 (Del. Super. 1980) is
helpful to analysis of the present case.

In Campbell the Court

examined the issue of whether money found in an abandoned stolen
safe and subsequently turned over to the police should be returned
to the finder or left in the hands of the police. The Court focused
on the pivotal issue of whether the money was stolen. As in the
case at bar, the finder of the money, Campbell, was acquitted of
Criminal Theft and Conspiracy charges.

(Campbell had found the

money in the abandoned and previously stolen safe and conspired with
another to keep the money.)

The Delaware statute Campbell relied on

provided goods "allegedly used in the commission of a crime . . .
shall be returned to the person from whom seized if such person is
not thereafter duly convicted of the alleged crime; . . . "
219.

Id. at

The Court considered Campbell's motion to return the property

criminal in nature, but consolidated his motion with the other
actions for summary resolution.

Id. at 213, 220. The Police relied

on another statute which authorized the Police to keep stolen money
in the custody of the Police as against the true owner.

Id. at 220.

In deciding neither party had a sufficiently strong case
for a summary judgment, the Court provided analysis helpful to the
case at bar. As in the present case, the statutes pertaining to
- 18 -

return of property were drafted with the intent of improving true
owners' chances of recovering their property.

Id. at 225. The

central issue the Court grappled with was whether the money found by
Campbell was indeed stolen.
with the police.

If it were stolen, ownership would vest

If the money found were determined not be stolen,

the money would be disposed of according to the statute controlling
"lost or abandoned" money and would be returned to Campbell.
In deciding the case should go to the jury, the Court
found the following facts insufficient as a matter of law to support
the position of the police that the money was stolen:
(1) Money was found in a "thieves" junkyard;
(2) Money was found in a previously stolen safe;
(3) Other stolen property was in the same area,
e.g., shipped cars and other safes;
(4) The bills were in relatively small
denominations and were packaged in
denominational order, i.e., $5 bills together,
$10 bills together, etc.;
(5) The money was found late at night;
(6) The failure of the depositer to attempt to
claim the full amount of money from the State
Police; and
(7) The large amount of money [$136,000.00] in the
package.
Id. at 226.
Appellant asserts the facts surrounding his claim to the
money in the case at bar in no way point to criminal activity.

The

State could only place him in the vicinity of where a crime was
committed.

The money was never found to be illegally possessed by

Appellant or linked to crime. Appellant argues if the facts set
- 19 -

forth in Campbell which provided several possible associations
between the money and criminal activity were insufficient to prove
the money was stolen as a matter of law, then under the Utah Statute
he has met his burden of proof in showing the money was lawfully
obtained.
Although the Utah statute in question provides no
guidance on the issue of burden of proof, Appellant relies on the
explanations set forth in Campbell v, Cochran to guide this Court.
Under the Delaware statute, the initial burden was placed on the
finder of the property show:

(1) he was the finder of the money,

(2) the money was in the custody of the police, and (3) that the
true owner had neither been located nor filed a claim for the
money.

Id. at 226. The Court concluded Campbell had met the

initial burden of proof and the dispute remaining concerned whether
the money was stolen.

The Court found the police must then show, by

a preponderance of the evidence that the money was stolen before the
burden of rebuttal would shift to Campbell.

Id.

The Court reasoned:

The Court's conclusion is based simply on the
mathematical probability that absent any
consideration of the facts in a particular case it
is more likely that found money was not stolen than
vice versa. Rather than make the finder thereof
prove a negative fact, i.e., that the money was not
stolen, it is more logical and reasonable to require
that defendant [Police] affirmatively prove the
existence of the disputed fact.
Id.
Appellant can cite to no Utah authority directly on point
regarding the sufficiency of evidence required for this statute and
therefore asks this Court to adopt the rationale set forth in
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Campbell v. Cochran. Applying those standards to the case at bar.
Appellant argues he has met his initial burden of showing the money
was not stolen by signing the affidavit of ownership and testifying
as to how he lawfully obtained the money through employment. He
would therefore have sustained the initial burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. The State never refuted his
testimony or in any way proved the money was illegally obtained.
Applying the standard of Campbell, the prosecutor would
be required to show by a preponderance of the evidence the money was
stolen or otherwise not lawfully possessed.
case at bar was unable to do this.

The prosecutor in the

The investigator was unable to

refute Appellant's assertions the money was lawfully obtained.
Therefore, there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law for
the court to rule against Appellant and his due process rights were
consequently violated.
POINT IV, THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFTED
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO APPELLANT, THEREBY DENYING
HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
The statute in question requires the owner of the
property to prove both ownership and lawfulness of possession
satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney before the owner is
entitled to return of the property (§77-24-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended)).
It is well settled the burden of proof in criminal cases
remains on the prosecution at all times. Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d
812 (Utah 1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 891, 101 S.Ct. 254, 66
L.Ed.2d 120 (1980).

In Pierre, the Court addressed Mr. Pierre's
- 21 -

concern that the burden of proof had been unconstitutionally shifted
to him at sentencing.

In ruling against Pierre, the Court reasoned

the defendant was simply allowed to present evidence in mitigation
if he so desired as part of the sentencing proceeding after the
State presented evidence. Pierre, the Court reasonsed, did not have
to meet any burden of proof.
In State v. Rebeterano, 681 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1984) the
Court addressed the issue of whether the state could meet its burden
of proving the corpus delecti of a homicide where no corpse could be
produced.

In ruling the prosecution could proceed, the Court found

the circumstantial evidence in the case was enough to sustain the
State on Rebeterano's challenge of insufficent evidence.

The Court

did note, however, the prosecution's burden in such a case is a
heavy one.

Id. at 1267.
Appellant's case differs significantly from both Pierre

and Rebeterano in that the statute places the burden on him to prove
both ownership and lawfulness of possession without first requiring
the state to meet an initial burden of proof that the money was
either not owned by Appellant or not lawfully possessed by him.
Such a shift in the burden of proof violates Appellant's
constitutional due process rights and abrogates principles set forth
in Pierre and Rebeterano.

The trial court's decision should

therefore be reversed as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's decision to
not return money seized at the time of his arrest. He further asks
- 22 -

this case be remanded to the trial court with an order that the
trial court order the return of Mr. Davis' property.
DATED this

day of November, 1987.

<T-"ELIZABETH B0WWAN
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, ELIZABETH BOWMAN, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230
South 500 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102,

and four

copies to James Housley, Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84115 this <^>U

day of November, 1987.

DELIVERED by

this

November, 1987.
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IN THIS DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
: FINDINGS. CONCLUSIONS AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT DAVIS* MOTION
TO COMPEL RETURN OF PROPERTY

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff.

Case NO. CR 84-1483

V.

CINDY L. SLAGOWSKI.
GWENDOLON CARTER HALL.
THOMAS EUGENE DAVIS.
CARL LINDELL BARR and
LARRY DARWIN PERSON.

Hon. Judge Timothy R. Hansen

Defendants.
Defendant
Return

Thomas

of Property,

Eugene

Davis1

Motion

to

Compel

the

to-wit: $277.38 in cash seized from said

Davis at the time of his arrest, came on regularly for hearing
on the 7th day of November. 1986. before the Honorable Philip
R.

Fishier.

Judge.

Defendant

Davis

being

present

and

represented by his Counsel. Jo Carol Nesset-Sale. and the State
being represented by Walter A. Ellett. Deputy Salt Lake County
Attorney,

and

the parties having presented

their evidence and

arguments and the Court being fully advised, enters its:

State v. Davis
Findings, Conclusion and Order
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FINDINGS
1.

That on October 30. 1984. at approximately 3:45 p.m..

David Bascom. an investigator for the Utah Attorney General's
Office, personally

observed

Turner,

"Turner").

hereafter

"Davis"),
Lindell

Larry
Barr

(hereafter

Darwin

Thomas

Person

(hereafter

"Hall"),

Cindy Slagowski

Davis

(hereafter

"Barr"),

conversing

Eugene

(true name Becky

and

with

"Person").

Gwendolen
each

(hereafter

Carter

other

and

Carl
Hall
moving

around and about two motor vehicles parked in a parking lot at
715 West North Temple;
2.

That said Bascom observed said Davis and said Turner

embracing and kissing and observed said Hall inside one of the
vehicles shuffling papers that appeared to be credit cards or
similar documents, and

saw said

Hall hand some of the said

papers to said Turner; and
3.

That

said

Bascom

continued

to

observe

said

individuals and observed Turner enter one vehicle and drive to
First Interstate Bank. 1955 West North Temple, with the other
four individuals in the second car following;
4.

That at approximately 4:00 p.m. on said date, said

Turner cashed a forged check in the amount of $396.85 at said
bank, and received $396.86 in payment

therefor, and that the

other four individuals remained outside in the second vehicle;
and
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5.

That

said Bascora observed

driven by said Turner, drive
bank

and

second

travel
vehicle,

eastbound

out

on

containing

of

North
the

the first

vehicle, being

the parking
Temple,
other

lot of said

followed

four

by

the

individuals,

following;
6.

That at approximately

Turner was arrested

attempting

4:15

p.m. on

said

to pass a second

date, said
forged check

drawn on the same account at 710 South 200 West;
7.

That Davis, Person, Barr and Carter were arrested a

few minutes later in the second motor vehicle at approximately
200 South 400 West and there were periods during those minutes
when the second motor vehicle was not under police surveillance;
8.

That a search of all five individuals and both motor

vehicles yielded no cash from either car; thirty-three cents in
the possession of Barr; $3.97 in the possession of Slagowski;
$11.95 in the possession of Carter; $151.09

in the possession

of Person; and $277.38 in the possession of Davis, for a total
of $444.62, which exceeded the amount received

total by Turner

Of $396.86 by $46.76;
9.

That

all

five

individuals

were

arrested

and

prosecuted in a two-count Information, that Turner pled guilty,
and that on February 3, 1986, the case against

the other four

individuals was dismissed pursuant to the State's motion, which
recited "that the witnesses who observed criminal activity are

State v. Davis
Findings, Conclusion and Order
Page 4
unable to make positive identification of said defendants, and
that the State would not be able to meet its burden of proof
with the evidence available at this time";
10.

That

Davis immediately

requested

the return of the

money and no other person has made formal claim to the funds;
11.

That

consultation
$277.38

the

with

seized

prosecutor,

the

case

James

detective,

from Davis was

no

longer

F.

Housley,

determined
"needed

after

that

the

as evidence"

within the meaning of §77-24-2, Utah Code Annotated

1953, and

notified Defendant through his attorney that he was prepared to
authorize the return of said

property to Davis upon

H

proof of

ownership satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney*;
12.

That at a meeting

Lake County Attorney

held

on February

in the office

of

the Salt

10, 1986. Davis presented a

pre-prepared affidavit which has been marked as Exhibit "A" and
attached

hereto

by

reference, -and

declined,

upon

Counsel, to be questioned under oath concerning
which

he

had

come

into

possession

of said

advice

of

the manner in

money,

and James

Housley, the prosecutor, refused to authorize the return of the
money to Davis, and that Davis did not sign a receipt prepared
by James F. Housley. attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
13.

That Counsel for Davis filed a Motion to Compel the

Return of the Property under

the criminal heading and noticed

it up for hearing before the undersigned, to whom the criminal
case had been assigned;
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14.

That after argument and submission of

memoranda

by

both parties on the issue of whether a proceeding ancillary to
the criminal case was a proper forum, as opposed
civil

proceeding,

to

determine

whether

the

to a separate

prosecutor

under

§77-24-2 had abused his discretion;
15.
photocopy

That

this

of which

Court

issued

is attached

a

Memorandum

Opinion,

a

hereto

as Exhibit

"C" and by

reference made a part hereof;
16.

That on June 19. 1986. Davis

with

Housley

under

oath,

seized

from

Housley1s

in

questions
him

at

office,

regarding

and

the

and

his

that

attorney met

Davis

sources

of

answered,

the

Davis 1

the time of his arrest.

$277.38
testimony

was that some of the funds were the result of auto detail work
for Steve Fisher at a Salt Lake auto paint shop, and that most
of it came through a business arrangement he had with one Mike
Garrity

wherein

they

would

sell

property

for

Jack

Bernel of

Peddler's Pawn Shop. Eighth South 200 West, at swap meets and
other

places

explained

that

and

receive

a

part

of

the

proceeds;

Davis

these two sources probably did not account for

all of the monies;
17.
was

That

Prosecutor

Housley

took

the

position

not going to authorize the return of said

funds to Davis

until forgery detective Jerry Campbell could verify
his allegations respecting it;.

that he

or refute
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18.

That

Davis*

Counsel

filed

a

Motion

for

an

evidentiary hearing on July 15, 1986, which was scheduled for
hearing on August 20, 1986;
19.
testified

That at the August

20th hearing. Prosecutor Housley

that he was not prepared

to authorize

the return of

the money to Davis for the following reasons:
a)
That Detective Campbell had not been
able to contact the persons mentioned by
Davis in the June 19 meeting, and could not
either confirm or refute what Davis had
stated at said meeting;
b)
That the facts reflected in Findings
numbered 1 through 8 above demonstrated to
Housley that it was very likely that in the
time between the receipt of the money by
Turner and the arrest of all parties it
would be extremely unlikely to dispose of
the money received by Turner; and
c)
That Housley had been told by Counsel
for Person during plea negotiations that
Person and Barr had obtained the forged
checks, recruited Turner to cash them, had
given Turner half of the proceeds from the
one check that she successfully cashed, and
had not seen what Turner had done with her
half of the proceeds;
20.

That

at

said

hearing. Detective Campbell

that he had made an effort a few days

before

testified

the hearing to

contact the individuals named by Mr. Davis without success, and
that he had been unable to verify or refute Davis1 statements;
21.

That

a record

of all proceedings

in this Court on

Davis 1 Motion to Compel the Return of Property has been made by
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the Court Reporter, and that the cost of preparing a transcript
of

said

proceedings would

be

far

in excess

of the amount of

money which is the subject of these proceedings.
CONCLUSIONS
1.

That

an ancillary

proceeding

in

the

above-entitled

criminal case is the appropriate forum for determination under
§77-24-2.

Utah

Code

Annotated

prosecuting attorney has abused
authorize

the

return

of

1953,

whether

or

not

the

his discretion in declining to

property

no

longer

needed

in

the

prosecution of said criminal case to Davis;
2.

That the burden of establishing

attorney has thus abused his discretion
in

this case Davis, and

that

that the prosecuting
is upon the claimant,

the standard

of

proof

is by a

preponderance of the evidence;
3.
of

the

That Davis has failed to establish by a preponderance
evidence

that

the

prosecuting

attorney

abused

his

discretion in this case; and
4.
determine

That

proceedings

whether

the

ancillary

prosecuting

to

a

criminal

attorney

has

case

abused

to
his

discretion in declining to authorize the return of property no
longer
Code

needed
Annotated

in a criminal
1953,

as

prosecution

amended,

is

under
not

§77-24-2, Utah
the

kind

of

a

proceeding where the Court must or should require the State to
bear the cost of preparing a transcript of such proceedings.
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ORDER
Based on said Findings and Conclusions, and good cause
appearing therefor, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.

That Davis* Motion to Compel the Return of Property

be, and the same hereby is, denied; and
2.

That Davis1 Motion to Compel thy State to Bear the

Cost of Transcribing the Record of these^ancillary proceedings
be, and the same hereby is, denied.
DATED this

/o? day of May, 1

ct Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

^4^c-ula/
Attorney for Defendant, Davis
(Copy Received May // , 1987)

( /rr^Cc* % L\rxju^^s

1^

S/S&/?7

A F F I D A V I T
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

I, Thomas E. Davis, am the lawful owner of the
$277.00 taken from me at the time of my arrest.
DATED this _ ^ _ ~ d a y of February, 1986.

THOMAS E. DAVIS

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

.9,
(QI^- day

of February, 1986.

My Commission Expires:
2-3-1-%%

MOTARY PUBLIC j
Residing in Stfit Lake City, Utah

tAM

^4fi$i-r%

RECEIPT

Received of

James

F.

Housley,

Deputy

Salt

Lake

County Attorney, $277.?0 in currency seized! by the Salt Lake
City Police Department in case # 84-96051.
I swear

that

I

am

the

owner,

and

entitled

to

possession of said property*
Dated this /£/

{

day of February, 1986.

-tt Carol/Nesset-Sale
Attorney
Eugene Davi<
Attorney for Thomas Eug<

Thomas Eugene Davis

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

Februaryf 1986.
My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC residing
in Salt Lake County, Utah

&J<{HArr <£»

» — •••» wucnrv'j) OFFICE

Salt Lake County Utah

JUN13 1986
H. Dixon Hindley. Clerk 3rd Dist Court

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD q&DICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH DeputyC,er*

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CR-84-1483

vs.
CINDY L. SLAGOWSKI, GWENDOLYN
CARTER HALL, THOMAS EUGENE
DAVIS, CARL LINDELL BARR, and
LARRY DARWIN PERSON,
Defendants.

Before the Court is the defendant Davis' Motion to Compel
the Return of Property.

The Court has heard argument on the

matter, and allowed the parties an opportunity to brief their
respective positions.

The Court has now received the briefs

from the parties, and has considered the oral argument, together
with the matters set forth in the Memorandums of law submitted,
and being otherwise fully advised, enters the following Memorandum
Decision.
In this case the defendant Davis seeks an Order from this
Court compelling the County Attorney's Office to return monies
in the amount of $277.43 that were apparently taken from Mr. Davis
at the time of his arrest. The case against Mr. Davis was dismissed.
Mr. Davis claims that he is the lawful owner of the money, and
has done so by a brief Affidavit, dated February 6, 1936.

The

County Attorney on behalf of the State of Utah takes the position

STATE V .

SLAGOWSKI

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

t h a t t h e y are e n t i t l e d t o inquire further of Mr. Davis beyond
tiis A f f i d a v i t regarding h i s ownership of the funds in question ,
and have r e f u s e d t o r e t u r n the above-mentioned monies to him.
The County A t t o r n e y f s Office a l s o takes the p o s i t i o n that any
q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e propriety or lack thereof of refusing
t o r e t u r n t h e funds t o Mr. Davis should be c i v i l

in nature,

and t h i s Court does not have j u r i s d i c t i o n to resolve the matter
i n the criminal

file.

The s t a t u t e that the p a r t i e s seek t o have t h i s Court interpret
as t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s i s Section 77-24-2 of the Utah
Code Ann.,

1953 as amended, v h i c h provides in substance that

property vhich has been s e i z e d incident t o an a r r e s t , and vhich
i s no longer needed as evidence s h a l l be returned to the owner
if

he may l a w f u l l y p o s s e s s

it.

That s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n i s

found i n t h e Criminal Code promulgated by the l e g i s l a t u r e , and
t h i s Court determines that i t does have j u r i s d i c t i o n to review
t h e s e m a t t e r s as a r e s u l t of the criminal case f i l i n g ,

and i s

n o t r e s t r i c t e d t o c o m p e l l i n g the^ defendant t o bring a c i v i l
a c t i o n t o r e c o v e r h i s funds.

Therefore,

in a proper case the

Court does and should e x e r c i s e i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n ,

and order the

return of property s e i z e d at the arrest of a criminal defendant
when the State l a t e r dismisses the charges.
The Court determines, however, that i t i s not the purpose
of t h e s t a t u t e t o place an absolute, non-reviewable

discretion
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t o determine whether or not

p r o p e r t y s e i z e d at t h e time of a r r e s t should be returned to
a c r i m i n a l defendant.

The s t a t u t e does, however, provide the

County A t t o r n e y with c e r t a i n d i s c r e t i o n and authority to make
r e a s o n a b l e inquiry, i f not d i r e c t l y by inference,
or n o t t h e defendant may "lawfully possess i t . , f

into whether
The Affidavit

s u b m i t t e d by defendant Davis i s inadequate in that regard, and
h i s apparent refusal t o comment further pursuant to the County
A t t o r n e y f s q u e s t i o n s as t o h i s a c q u i s i t i o n of those funds i s
e q u a l l y improper.

I f t h e defendant

Davis f e e l s t h a t he can

make no s t r o n g e r statement or e x p l a i n f u r t h e r h i s claims to
p o s s e s s i o n of the funds o t h e r than t h e conclusory
t h a t he i s l a w f u l l y e n t i t l e d t o p o s s e s s i t ,

statement

then the County

Attorney i s e n t i t l e d t o withhold the funds.
Therefore the Court, based upon t h e s t a t e of the record
a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e , d e n i e s t h e Motion t o Compel the return
of the $277.43.

Should Mr. Davis be w i l l i n g t o answer reasonable

q u e s t i o n s and other i n q u i r y of t h e County A t t o r n e y ' s

Office

regarding h i s lawful right t o the funds, then he may be entitled
t o r e c e i v e t h o s e funds from t h e County Attorney.

This Court

i s of t h e o p i n i o n , however, t h a t should a dispute arise as to
whether or not a s a t i s f a c t o r y explanation has been made i s reviewable
by t h i s Court in an a p p r o p r i a t e e v i d e n t i a r y hearing, i f such
a recruest i s made.
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The Salt Lake County Attorney*s Office is directed to prepare
an Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit
the same to the Court for review and signature in accordance
with the Local Rules of Practice,
Dated this

/C

dav of June, 1986.

_M
TIMOTHY R. HAHSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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